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Introduction
In this paper we analyze mergers when …rms sell their (homogenous) products in geographically di¤erentiated markets (as for example, national markets of di¤erent countries). We assume that the supply side is perfectly integrated, so that …rms can serve all markets without incurring any additional costs. In contrast to standard approaches of international oligopoly theory (e.g., Brander 1995) , third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly (e.g., Holmes 1989) , and international merger control (e.g., Barros and Cabral 1994) which analyzed the integration of the supply side of markets, we make the possibility of demand substitution between markets explicit. This allows us to analyze how buyer mobility, or equivalently, the extent of consumer arbitrage between di¤erent markets a¤ects …rms' merger incentives and the assessment of the competitive e¤ects of mergers.
Our analysis is motivated by the fact that markets become increasingly integrated not only from manufacturers'perspective but also from a consumer perspective. Accordingly, the phenomenon of "globalization"is often associated with the "death of distance" as transport, logistic and distribution costs have been declining and innovations in information and communications technologies have made international business as well as arbitrage much more e¤ective (in particular, through Internet-based intermediation, as e.g., E-Bay or Amazon). At the same time (and this is particularly true for the European Union) a massive reduction of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to international trade paved the way for the deepening of market integration across formerly separated regions and countries. 1 1 Focusing on the EU, several studies have recently analyzed the implications of increasing market integration for the de…nition of the relevant geographical market (Padilla 2001 , Sleuwaegen, De Voldere, and Pennings 2001 , and EU 2003 . Interestingly, those studies focus mainly on supply-side market integration while demand-side market integration plays only a minor role. Sleuwaegen, De Voldere, and Pennings (2001) describe the competitive environment in the EU as being characterized by multi-market competition with border e¤ects. While the supply-side tends to become more or less perfectly integrated (e.g., because of international distribution systems or distributed production facilities), border e¤ects mirror remaining segmentations on the demand-side. However, the implications of those border e¤ects remain unexplored.
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When regional demands become more integrated (i.e., consumers …nd it easier to buy products in other regions), …rms will …nd it harder to price discriminate across di¤erent regional markets. Consequently, …rms have then incentives to adopt counteractive measures to restore discriminatory outcomes. Perhaps most prominently, vertical restraints (imposed by a manufacturer on regional intermediaries) and/or product di¤erentiation strategies may be used to suppress consumer arbitrage. However, using vertical restraints to prevent resales across sales areas (or, parallel trade in an international context) may not be a feasible option because of antitrust laws.
2 Similarly, product di¤erentiation strategies (e.g., selling "damaged goods"in low-demand regions) may not be a viable option either if the product is inherently not modi…able (as, for example, in pharmaceuticals).
In this paper we focus on horizontal mergers as a counter strategy to prevent consumer arbitrage so as to reap the bene…ts from price discrimination. For this purpose, we expand the standard Cournot oligopoly model by considering two markets (regions) which are connected through imperfect consumer arbitrage. We suppose a high-demand market and a low-demand market such that the market price and …rms'pro…ts are strictly larger in the high-demand market if both markets were perfectly segmented. We assume that the supply-side is perfectly integrated so that …rms are indi¤erent from a transportation cost perspective between serving each of the markets. We suppose a mobility function which speci…es for each consumer the transportation costs he has to forgo if the product is bought in the foreign region. Given the market demands and consumers'mobility costs we obtain aggregated demands where some consumers of the high-demand market buy the product in the low-demand market (where a lower price prevails if the low-demand market is served). We analyze the Cournot-Nash equilibria when …rms set the quantities they supply in both markets simultaneously. which state that manufacturers may restrict active resales (if a …rm's market share is su¢ ciently small) but must not restrict passive resales, where passive resales refer exactly to the kind of consumer-driven arbitrage which is the core of our analysis.
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Our main results are the following: First, there may exist two equilibrium constellations where either both markets are served (the "interior equilibrium") or only the highdemand market is served (the "corner equilibrium"). Second, the equilibrium in which only the high-demand market is served (and none of the consumers in the low demand market can a¤ord to buy the product) becomes more likely if transportation costs decrease (or, markets become more integrated) and/or if concentration (e.g., through a merger)
increases. Moreover, existence of a corner equilibrium is only guaranteed if the demands of both markets are su¢ ciently asymmetric. Third, in the interior equilibrium …rms try to avoid consumer arbitrage by o¤ering relatively large quantities in the high-demand market and relatively small quantities in the low-demand market. Hence, the equilibrium quantities o¤ered in the high-demand (low-demand) market are larger (smaller) than the corresponding Cournot quantities that would prevail if markets were perfectly segmented.
With those results at hand, we derive our main …nding that imperfect market integration (from a consumer perspective) may give rise to incentives to merge which are not discussed in the merger literature so far (see, e.g., Ivaldi et al. 2003 and Whinston 2006 for recent overviews). Those merger incentives result from …rms'desire to suppress sales in a low-demand market so as to increase the pro…t from exclusive sales to the high-demand market. Precisely, by referring to a linear demand speci…cation we can fully characterize the equilibrium outcomes and …rms' merger incentives. We show that with more than two …rms a merger is never pro…table if …rms remain in the interior equilibrium after the merger. However, if a merger moves the industry into the parameter region where the corner equilibrium becomes feasible, then a merger may become pro…table if all …rms select (the then pareto-dominant) strategies consistent with the corner equilibrium. Such a constellation becomes more likely the lower consumers'mobility costs.
We also analyze the welfare losses associated with a bilateral merger. We show that the adverse welfare e¤ects of a merger which provokes a corner equilibrium increases whenever consumer mobility increases. The opposite is true if the industry remains in the interior equilibrium after the merger. While the latter observation mirrors the fact that increasing (demand-side) market integration should counter possible adverse merger e¤ects, the former result shows that this optimistic view may be premature. Rather 4 the opposite may happen: If merger incentives are driven by …rms' desire to counter consumer arbitrage, then increasing (demand-side) market integration may increase the …rms'incentives to merge as well as the adverse e¤ects of a merger on social welfare.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature: the merger literature and the literature on (third-degree) price discrimination.
With regards to merger incentives, our paper contributes to the large literature on mergers in Cournot markets. In their seminal work, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) proved that a bilateral merger is typically not pro…table when …rms compete in a homogeneous product market. 3 They assumed symmetric …rms, linear demand, and constant marginal costs. Those assumptions, and with that, the controversial "merger paradox,"
have been criticized in the subsequent literature. By that, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds' model has been enriched by many supply-side features as, for instance, synergies (Farrell and Shapiro 1990), Bertrand behavior (Deneckere and Davidson 1985) , di¤erent cost speci…cations (Levin 1990 and Perry and Porter 1985) , Stackelberg-leadership (Daughety 1990), multi-product rivalry (Lommerud and Sörgard 1997) , input market bargaining and purchasing power Wolinsky 1988 and von Ungern-Sternberg 1996, resp.) , product di¤erentiation (Inderst and Wey 2004) , and spatially di¤erentiated suppliers (McAfee, Simons, and Williams 1992) .
Interestingly, this literature has exclusively focused on supply-side aspects, while demand-side sources of adverse competitive e¤ects of mergers have been suppressed. International aspects of mergers have been addressed in Barros and Cabral (1994) in an extension of Farrell and Shapiro's (1990) seminal paper, Levinsohn (2001), Bjorvatn (2004) , Lommerud, Straume and Sörgard (2006) , and Qiu and Zhou (2006) . Again, this literature has focused on the e¤ects of supply-side market integration (through imports and exports) and mergers, while disregarding the possibility of demand mobility.
Our analysis of price discrimination across regions is also related to the literature of third degree-price discrimination in oligopoly (see, e.g., Neven and Phlips 1985 , Holmes 1989 , and, for surveys, Varian 1989 and Stole 2003 . This literature has focused largely 3 See Selten (1973) for a similar reasoning in the context of cartel formation.
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on the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination when compared with a regime which bans price discrimination. Moreover, our analysis is related to Malueg and Schwartz (1994) and Anderson and Ginsburgh (1999) who studied a monopolist's pricing decision and the associated welfare e¤ects in the presence of parallel trade.
In the following we …rst set out the general model in section 2. In section 3 we characterize the properties of the Cournot equilibria. Section 4 examines merger incentives and their e¤ects on market outcomes by referring to a numerical example. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a Cournot oligopoly model with n 1 …rms o¤ering a homogeneous product in two markets j = h; l, where h and l stand for the high-demand and low-demand market, respectively. 4 All …rms face the same production costs which we normalize to zero. In addition, …rms'costs of supplying their products in each market are the same. We also normalize those transportation and distribution costs to zero. Hence, both markets are perfectly integrated from a supply-side perspective.
In each market j = h; l there is a unit mass of consumers which we refer to as jconsumers. Consumers can decide in which market they buy and how much they demand.
We …rst consider the demand decisions in market j. We suppose that all j-consumers have the same quasi-linear utility function
where x is the quantity consumed and p the product price. The following assumption speci…es the properties of consumers'gross utilities u j (x).
Assumption 1. Consumers' gross utility functions u j (x), j = h; l, ful…ll the following properties:
Property i) guarantees that demand functions are downward sloping and concave.
Property ii) implies that marginal revenues are strictly larger in the high-demand market than in the low-demand market:
Hence, the high-demand market is also the more pro…table market from a …rm's perspective.
Let us next turn to the consumer decision in which market to buy. If a consumer buys in the foreign market, then he incurs a constant transport cost, t, which di¤ers among consumers. Buying in the home market does not involve similar transportation costs. Transportation costs depend on a consumer speci…c parameter, j , and on a shift parameter, , which measures the degree of market integration. The following assumption speci…es the exact properties of consumers'transportation cost function, t( j ; ).
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Assumption 2. Consumers'transportation costs, t( j ; ), for buying in the foreign market depend on a consumer speci…c parameter, j , j = h; l, which is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1] and a shift parameter, , with the following properties:
ii) t ( j ; ) > 0 and t ( j ; ) = 0, for j > 0, and iii) t ( j ; ) < 0, for j > 0.
Property i) of Assumption 2 guarantees that there exists a consumer with zero transportation costs in each market. Hence, if prices di¤er in both markets, then some consumers will always …nd it optimal to buy in the foreign market (provided demand is positive). Property ii) speci…es that transportation costs increase linearly over the set of consumers in each market. The shift parameter which measures the degree of market integration (from a buyer perspective) is characterized by property iii). A higher value of the parameter reduces each consumer's transportation costs. Hence, consumers become more mobile and markets more integrated with increasing values of .
We can now specify the net utility of a j-consumer of type j for given prices p h and p l in the high-demand and the low-demand market. De…ning 
with j; k = h; l and k 6 = j. Using (2) and de…ning
we obtain the following aggregate demand functions X D h (p h ; p l ; ) and X D l (p h ; p l ; ) in market h and l, respectively:
The demand system (4)- (5) shows that overall demand in a market j consists of the home demand and a fraction, j ( ), of the demand from abroad if the market price is higher abroad. Conversely, the market with the higher price consists only of a fraction, 1 j ( ), of its home market demand. Let x j denote the total quantity supplied in market j, with j = h; l. The inverse demand functions P h (x h ; x l ; ) and P l (x h ; x l ; ) implied by the demand system (4)- (5) then satisfy
We assume that …rms play a Cournot game where all …rms choose their quantities for the high-demand and the low-demand market simultaneously. In the following we …rst examine the main properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
In a second step we analyze …rms'merger incentives and their consequences. 6 In the following we will omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead to any confusion.
3 General Analysis
We assume that …rms simultaneously choose the quantities they supply in both markets.
Let x i j denote the quantity which …rm i (i = 1; :::; n) supplies in market j = h; l. We de…ne the total supply of …rm i's competitors in market j as
We can then write …rm i's pro…t function, i (x
which is the sum of revenues generated in market h and in market l. Di¤erentiating …rm i's pro…t function (8) with respect to x i j leads to the following …rst-order conditions
for i = 1; :::; n and j; k = h; l, with k 6 = j, where @P j =@x j and @P k =@x j follow from di¤erentiating (6) and applying the implicit function theorem.
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Inspection of the …rst-order conditions (9) shows that there may exist two types of Cournot-Nash equilibria depending on whether or not both markets are served. We will refer to an equilibrium in which both markets are served as an "interior equilibrium."
There may also exist an equilibrium such that a …rm's equilibrium supply is strictly positive only in the high-demand market, while supply to the low-demand market is set to zero. We will refer to this outcome as a "corner equilibrium."
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In the following we establish existence conditions and characterize the main properties of both equilibrium outcomes. We start with the analysis of the corner equilibrium and then turn to the interior equilibrium.
The Corner Equilibrium. In a corner equilibrium …rms do not supply any quantities in the low-demand market (i.e., x l = 0) but strictly positive quantities in the high-demand 7 Note that the inverse demand functions are not di¤erentiable at quantities x h and x l such that
j then refer to the right-hand side derivatives. 8 The inverse constellation with x h = 0 and x l > 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium outcome. This
9 market (i.e., x h > 0).
9 Then, the …rst-order conditions for …rms'optimal quantities x i h are given by
Assuming the existence of a corner equilibrium, the following lemma establishes its main properties.
Lemma 1. If a corner equilibrium with x h > 0 and x l = 0 exists, then it is unique.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is symmetric, with x i h (n) = x h (n)=n and x i l = 0, for i = 1; :::; n. Moreover, the following properties hold:
, and
Proof. See Appendix.
The properties i) and ii) of Lemma 1 establish standard comparative static results of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium. In particular, an increase in the number of …rms increases total output while it decreases each …rm's individual output. Property iii) reveals that a corner equilibrium with x h > 0 and x l = 0 implies the existence of a su¢ ciently low reservation price in the low-demand market such that P h (x h ; 0; ) > p l holds. Intuitively, with P h (x h ; 0; ) p l the price in the high-demand market is so low that each …rm has a strictly positive incentive to increase its pro…t by serving the residual demand in the low-demand market; i.e., those l-consumers who would not …nd it optimal to buy in an exclusively served high-demand market. As an immediate implication of property iii),
we conclude that any corner equilibrium involves a complete withdrawal of supply to the low-demand consumers.
We now examine the existence of a corner equilibrium. A corner equilibrium exists if and only if no …rm …nds it pro…table to deviate by supplying strictly positive quantities in the low-demand market; i.e., if and only if 
Condition i) of Lemma 2 mirrors the fact that a deviation can only be worthwhile if more consumers are served. Condition ii) shows the basic trade-o¤ implied by o¤ering positive quantities in the low-demand market. With P h > P l some h-consumers buy in the low-demand market which necessarily lowers the price in the high-demand market.
Hence, the lower the transportation costs, i.e., the higher , the less attractive such a deviation should become. Moreover, inspecting the price level in the high-demand market, we should expect that the lower the price P h (x h (n); 0; ) the larger the incentive to deviate. Taking into account dx h (n)/ dn > 0 and thus dP h / dn < 0 the incentives to deviate should, therefore, be positively correlated with the number of …rms. Analyzing the impact of and n on a …rm's incentives to deviate more carefully, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The maximal attainable pro…t from deviation, d i (n; ), ful…lls the following properties. i)
Property i) of Lemma 3 reiterates that the optimal deviation pro…t decreases as competition becomes more intense both through lower transportation costs and an increase in the number of …rms. More importantly, Property ii) states that an increase in the number of …rms induces a sharper decrease of a …rm's pro…t in the corner equilibrium when compared with the maximal deviation pro…t.
Combining parts i) and ii) of Lemma 3 allows us to characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a corner equilibrium in which only the highdemand market is served.
Then, a corner equilibrium with x h > 0 and x l = 0 exists if and only if
is true, then parts i) and ii) of Lemma 3 imply that there exists a unique n > 1 such that d i (n; ) = i (n). Applying the implicit function theorem gives that the critical value n k ( ) is monotonically increasing in . Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 states that the existence of a corner equilibrium critically depends on the number of …rms (or, conversely, on industry concentration) and the degree of market integration. Precisely, a corner equilibrium is the more likely to exist, the smaller the number of …rms (or, the higher the concentration level) and the higher the degree of market integration (or, the lower consumer transportation costs). The former e¤ect follows from the sensitivity of …rms'pro…ts due to an increase in the number of competitors as stated in Lemma 3. The latter result follows from the positive sign of n k0 ( ). A higher value of (or, lower transportation cost) makes a deviation less attractive (and hence, a corner equilibrium more likely) as this induces more h-consumers to buy in the low demand market (in case of deviation).
The fact that increasing market integration (or, lower transportation cost) increases the likelihood of a corner equilibrium deserves some attention. Those cases illustrate that arbitrage (though imperfect) occurs and that …rms have incentives to take actions to prevent the resale of their products into regions where higher prices are achievable. Those actions may lead to a complete cut o¤ as …rms …nd it increasingly harder to segment markets by vertical restraints or other practices. Moreover, the examples also show that the a corner equilibrium outcome becomes more likely when 10 The e¤ects of parallel have been examined empirically in Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) . They …nd that parallel trade decreased drug prices by 12-19% in Sweden in 1994 12-19% in Sweden in -1999 See for the description of this case "Court Adviser Says Glaxo Broke EU Antitrust Laws,"Wall Street Journal Europe, 2 April 2008, p. 5.
12 While the cut o¤ was complete for wholesaler it was not from patients'perspective as GlaxoSmithKline sold directly to hospitals and pharmacies in Greece in that period. After that period the company resumed sales to the wholesalers, but …lled their orders only partially, so that it was shipping only enough medication for the Greek market. Recently, the European Court of Justice decided that restricting delivery to "ordinary orders" should be judged as a "reasonable restriction" on wholesalers (see ECJ 2008).
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arbitrage increases.
We now turn to the analysis of the interior equilibrium.
The Interior Equilibrium. When …rms supply positive quantities in both markets, the relevant …rst-order conditions are given by
for i = 1; :::; n. Analyzing the system of …rst-order conditions (12) and (13), we obtain the following proposition (the superscript c marks the interior equilibrium). 
The …rst inequality of condition i) of Proposition 2 states that the price in the highdemand market is lower in the interior equilibrium than in the corner equilibrium. This follows intuitively from the second inequality of condition i) which implies that some hconsumers buy the product in the low-demand market in the interior equilibrium. The conditions ii) and iii) together mirror the fact that …rms try to avoid consumer arbitrage (i.e., prevent h-consumers from buying in the low-demand market) by o¤ering relatively large quantities in the high-demand market and relatively small quantities in the lowdemand market. More precisely, given the number of h-consumers who decide to buy in the low-demand market, the equilibrium quantities o¤ered in the high-demand market are larger than the corresponding Cournot quantities that would prevail if markets were perfectly segmented. The opposite holds for the low-demand market such that …rms'quantities are smaller than in the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. By narrowing the price di¤erential between both markets, …rms'losses from consumer arbitrage are reduced. Nevertheless, this feature also implies that …rms'pro…ts 
Let e x id h denote the quantity which maximizes the deviation pro…t (14) and let e d i (e x id h ; ) be the corresponding maximal deviation pro…t. Clearly, the condition for a pro…table
is not ful…lled if
holds. Hence, an interior equilibrium does exist if (given the equilibrium quantities for n …rms) a reduction of the number of …rms by 1 does not lead to a situation where no l-consumer actually buys. Note, however, that the inequality (15) is only a su¢ cient condition for the existence of an interior equilibrium.
As a more detailed comparison of e d i ( ) and c i (n; ) depends on the functional forms in a rather complicated way, we refer in the following to an example. This example also allows us to characterize the conditions under which both corner and interior equilibria exist. Furthermore, we can perform a complete analysis of …rms'merger incentives and we are able to describe the e¤ects which mergers have on market outcomes.
Merger Analysis
As is well-known from the Cournot-based merger literature, merger incentives are quite small (if not absent) when …rms are symmetric, products are homogenous and marginal 15 costs are constant. While the respective literature has produced several variations since Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds'(1983) seminal paper, we follow the route of our previous analysis which gives rise to new merger incentives based on …rms'incentives to counter the adverse e¤ects of increasing market integration. As increasing buyer mobility (or, equivalently, lower transportation cost) reduces …rms'pro…ts whenever both markets are served, …rms' pro…ts may be higher when it becomes feasible to select the corner equilibrium where only the high-demand market is served. This observation together with the result that the existence of a corner equilibrium is more likely the lower the number of …rms (Proposition 1) establishes the basic merger incentive on which we focus in the following.
Precisely, suppose that the number of …rms before the merger is n > 2, and let c i (n; ) < i (n). Assume also that before merger only an interior equilibrium exists, while after a two-…rm merger a corner equilibrium exists as well, i.e. n 1 < n k ( ). Then, a merger is pro…table if
holds and if the industry switches after the merger to the corner equilibrium. Note, that the selection of the corner equilibrium is reasonable if the …rms are better o¤ in the corner equilibrium when compared with the corresponding interior equilibrium; i.e., if
holds. Taking both properties (namely, feasibility and pro…tability) together, a merger can be uniquely traced back to the incentive to withdraw supplies to the low-demand market as long as conditions (16) and (17), and additionally,
hold. Note that conditions (18) and (16) imply condition (17). As the analysis of the conditions (16) and (18) involves a rather complicated comparison of …rms'pro…t levels under di¤erent market structures, the following analysis is based on an example with linear demands. While this, of course, restricts the generality of our analysis it allows us to derive explicit results with respect to the conditions which and n have to ful…ll such that requirements (16) and (18) are satis…ed.
An Example
We assume the following speci…cation of consumers'utilities in markets j = h; l and of consumers'transportation costs:
The utility functions give rise to linear demands as it has been assumed in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) . As they have shown, under perfectly segmented markets the socalled 80% rule holds, so that any bilateral merger which does not perfectly monopolize the market is never pro…table. As we will show below, our pro…tability condition (16) signi…cantly quali…es that result. Furthermore, comparing the results for b = 0:2 and b = 0:5 we get that mergers which induce the …rms to switch from an interior to a corner equilibrium are less likely to be pro…table the steeper the slope of the inverse demand function on the market with the low demand, i.e. the higher b.
Using our example (19) and considering the corner equilibrium in which only the high-demand market is served, we obtain the following equilibrium values:
Inspecting (20) and applying Lemma 1, it is immediate that a corner equilibrium with (x h ; 0) does not exist for n 9. Turning to the deviation pro…t d i (n; ) and using (20) and 
13 In order to shorten the notation, we omit b as an argument of the respective functions.
and for the respective …rst-order conditions the following expressions:
If both markets are served, we can use Proposition 2 to calculate the relevant pro…t functions and …rst-order conditions. Using symmetry and 
where
h ; ) are determined by the following two equations
+n (2 2p l + 3p h ( 2 + p h + p l ))] , and
Finally, assuming existence of an interior equilibrium, the deviation pro…t e i ( ) can be written as 
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The optimal deviation supply e x id h is then implicitly determined by
We are now in a position to fully analyze the existence of the two equilibria and …rms' incentives to merge.
Results
Starting with existence, using expressions (20)- (28) and comparing …rms'pro…ts, we obtain that there exists a unique critical value, n c ( ), such that the interior equilibrium does only exist if n > n c ( ) holds. 14 Furthermore, calculating n k ( ) we get that n k ( ) > n c ( ) holds, for all , with n k ( ) > 1. Hence, there exist parameter constellations of n and such that both a corner equilibrium and an interior equilibrium coexist (that region of parameter constellations is indicated by the shaded areas in Figure 1 and 2 below).
Turning to …rms' incentives to merge and analyzing equations (24) and (26) However, a comparison of …rms'pro…ts in the interior equilibrium and in the corner equilibrium reveals that there exists a unique critical value, n f ( ), such that for all n < 14 Note that n c ( ) as well as n k ( ) and n f ( ) (which is de…ned below) also depend on b. Again, to save notation we omit b as an argument of those functions. n f ( ) a merger is pro…table as long as it also implies that …rms switch to the corner equilibrium after the merger; i.e., the condition for a pro…table merger From Figure 1 we observe that any merger which ful…lls n c ( ) n 1 n k ( ) < n is pro…table; i.e., meets the requirement n < n f ( ), if all …rms select the corner equilibrium after the merger. Considering the parameter values 1:2 and n = 4 a merger between two …rms moves the industry into the region where the corner equilibrium becomes both feasible and pro…table.
Setting b = 0:5, we obtain the graphs depicted in Figure 2 .
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 shows that an increase in b leads to an upward shift of n k ( ) and n c ( ). The higher b the steeper the inverse demand curve of l-consumers, and thus, the lower the pro…ts from deviating. Considering relative low values of reveals that although a merger may allow to achieve the corner equilibrium, such a merger may not be pro…table due to the losses the …rms would have to bear by not serving the l-consumers.
This situation occurs for all and n such that n > n k ( ) > n 1 and n > n f ( ). For example, with 0:8 and n = 5 a merger is not pro…table. and n = 6 a merger of two …rms is pro…table, again. Quite interestingly, this example also
shows that a bilateral merger may be more likely to be pro…table in a less concentrated
market.
Finally, we analyze the welfare consequences of a merger which induces …rms'to select the corner equilibrium. We de…ne social welfare as the sum of consumer rents and the …rms'pro…ts which gives the welfare formulas
where W (n) and W c ( ; n) stand for the social welfare in the corner equilibrium and in the interior equilibrium, respectively (P h ; P l and h are evaluated at the the respective equilibrium quantities x h ; x c h and x c l ). Figure 3 indicates that the welfare loss due to a merger that induces a switch from an interior equilibrium to a corner equilibrium is substantially higher than the welfare loss which would result if …rms stick to the strategies consistent with the interior equilibrium.
For example, consider the left graph of Figure 3 which compares the corresponding welfare losses associated with a bilateral merger in a four-…rm industry (with b = 0:2). Inspecting the graph, the welfare loss is roughly four times higher when the merger induces the industry to switch into the corner equilibrium when compared with an "interior-equilibrium" merger. that the adverse welfare e¤ects of a merger which provokes a corner equilibrium increases whenever consumer mobility increases. The opposite is true if the industry remains in the interior equilibrium after the merger; i.e., W c ( ; n) W c ( ; n 1) is decreasing in . While the latter observation mirrors the generally agreed upon assessment that increasing (demand-side) market integration should counter possible adverse merger e¤ects, the former result shows that this optimistic view may be premature. If merger incentives are driven by …rms'desire to counter consumer arbitrage, then increasing (demand-side) market integration increases both …rms' merger incentives and the adverse e¤ects of a merger on social welfare.
Conclusion
We have presented a Cournot model with symmetric …rms which sell their (homogeneous) products in di¤erent and asymmetric markets which are neither perfectly integrated nor perfectly segmented (from a consumer perspective). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that (imperfect) arbitrage occurs when prices di¤er in both market regions. We showed that …rms'incentives to discriminate between both markets together with buyer mobility give rise to new strategic and competitive e¤ects of mergers.
As long as both markets are served market equilibria are distorted away from Cournot outcomes. A merger reduces this distortion by widening the price di¤erential between both market regions. Most importantly, a merger can lead to an equilibrium outcome in which only the high-demand market region is served. As pro…ts are never lower in such a corner equilibrium when compared with the interior equilibrium (where both markets are served), we expect that …rms'may have monopolizing merger incentives in order to move the industry into the corner equilibrium. This merger incentives becomes the stronger i) the more integrated markets become (i.e., the lower consumer transportation costs), and/or ii) the higher the concentration of the industry.
Our analysis has several implications for antitrust authorities'merger control. As has been argued by proponents of an "e¤ects based approach" to competition policy, our analysis also points at the dangers of a two-step procedure, where the market is de…ned in the …rst stage and the analysis of the competitive e¤ects of a merger remains mainly con…ned to the then de…ned relevant market in a second step. 16 While much of the critique has focused on additional supply-side sources of competition which have been alleged to be not properly taken into account by the standard market de…nition procedure, we argue that a too narrow market de…nition (which cuts out imperfect demand-side arbitrage relations between market areas) may lead to type-2 errors (i.e., approving falsely anticompetitive mergers) which can lead to substantial consumer harm (i.e., a discriminatory equilibrium outcome where low-demand regions are not served anymore and the price effects are much larger in the high-demand market than standard analysis would suggest).
The anticompetitive discriminatory merger incentive of our analysis can only be detected if the geographical market is de…ned rather broadly so that those regions are included in the analysis which are only loosely connected with the main market. As standard market de…nition tests (e.g., the SSNIP test) focus on the smallest relevant market worth monopolizing, those tests run into danger of de…ning markets too narrow. 17 In those settings, our analysis has shown that …rms may want to merge in order to avoid intrabrand cannibalization (which occurs when all markets are served) by tipping the market into a discriminatory equilibrium through a merger in which only the high-demand country is served.
We …nally, conjecture that our analysis is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, where signi…cant asymmetries between countries (and hence, price di¤erences) prevail because of institutional di¤erences in health regulations. Several studies show that large pharmaceutical …rms have strong incentives to sustain price discrimination through market segmentation strategies; if necessary by completely abstaining from selling to all wholesalers in a country as our description if the GlaxoSmithKline case has shown. While …rms typically use various sorts of vertical restraints to sustain price discrimination, we suspect that horizontal mergers may serve similar purposes.
17 Our point is related to Davidson (1983) who emphasized that segmented markets may give rise to pronounced anticompetitive e¤ects which are not mirrored in more standard market de…nition tests and HHI criteria. See also Bernheim and Whinston (1990) for a model which suggests to consider multi-market contact features in merger control.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume P h (x h ; 0; ) > p l and note that this also implies that only h-consumers buy the product in the home market. Note also that i (x i h ; 0; x i h ; 0; ) does not depend on . 18 Inspection of …rms'…rst-order conditions (10) implies symmetry.
Employing standard arguments with respect to the slope of the …rms'reaction functions establishes uniqueness. Hence, we obtain x i h (n) and x i h (n) = x h (n)=n. Furthermore, it is easy to show that x i h (n) and i (n) have the following (standard) properties
where (30) follows from (29) and the envelope theorem. For later reference note also that we have
To show that P h (x h ; 0; ) > p l must hold assume …rst that P h (x h ; 0; ) = p l holds.
P h (x h ; 0; ) = p l implies that the marginal revenue of increasing x i l is strictly positive while the loss from h-consumers buying in the low-demand market l is only of second order. Hence, each …rm would have an incentive to deviate by choosing x i l > 0, so that P h (x h ; 0; ) = p l can not hold in a corner equilibrium. Assuming P h (x h ; 0; ) < p l and using w.l.o.g. P l (x h ; 0; ) = p l , a fraction l (P h (x h ; 0; ); p l ; ) of l-consumers would buy in market h. LetX l := l (P h (x h ; 0; ); p l ; )X l (P h (x h ; 0; )) and consider the follow- 
…rm i's pro…t is higher when it chooses (x i h ;x i l ) instead of (x i h ; 0). Therefore, in any corner equilibrium with x h > 0 and x l = 0 it must hold that P h (x h ; 0; ) > p l . Q.E.D. 18 Recall that the arguments of the pro…t function are written in the following order:
Proof of Lemma 2. P l (x id l ; x id h + x i h ; ) < p l is implied by Lemma 1. The proof of part ii) proceeds in two steps: We …rst show
Step 1. In order to show
we get that the optimal quantities x id h and x id l are implicitly de…ned by
where we used
Analyzing (34) and taking into account part ii) of Assumption 1 as well as t ( ) >
reveals that a deviation which leads to
Considering P h = P l = P we must have 
) and taking limits we get 26 (omitting arguments)
Comparing (36) and (37) as well as (38) and (39) and taking into account
shows that (35) can not hold. Thus, we must have
Step 2. Turning to
h ; ), the …rst-order conditions (33) can be written as
To prove P h X h (P h ) > P l X h (P l ), assume to the contrary that
id l > 0 which can not be optimal since …rm i can increase its pro…t by simply increasing x i h and decreasing x i l . Hence we must have P l X h (P l ) P h X h (P h ) < 0 which also implies Proof of Lemma 3. Part i) is based on applying the envelope theorem which yields 
Using (30) and (42) that an equilibrium with P h = P l does not exist. Using P h 6 = P l we proceed by proving symmetry and then turn to the qualitative properties of the interior equilibrium. Finally, we prove uniqueness.
Symmetry. Assume to the contrary that asymmetric equilibria exist, where …rms supply on either di¤erent markets or at least one …rm is not active on both markets. Then there would exist i and j with i 6 = j such that 
Assuming P h > P l and solving these conditions for the respective equilibrium quantities, (44) implies that prices must satisfy
Similarly, employing (45) we get
while (46) leads to
have
Assuming P l X h (P l ) P h X h (P h ) > 0 leads to a contradiction since …rm i can increase its pro…t by increasing x i h and decreasing x i l . Hence, we must have P h X h (P h ) > P l X h (P l ) and thus (1 h )P h X 0 h (P h ) + x ic h > 0 which also leads to P h (x h ; 0; ) > P h (x c h ; x c l ; ) (see (31)). Finally, P h X h (P h ) > P l X h (P l ) and (54) imply P l (X 0 l (P l ) + l X 0 h (P l )) + x ic l < 0.
Uniqueness. De…ning h (P h ; n) : =
e l (P l ; n) : = P l X 0 l (P l ) +
and R h (P h ) := P h X h (P h ) and R l (P l ) := P l X h (P l ), equations (54) can be transformed to (omitting arguments and using symmetry)
(1 h ) h + h l + e l = 0.
Using (57), holding n and constant and interpreting P h as a function of P l the implicit function theorem leads to
Applying part i) of the proposition we get that 0 (P l ) > 0 must hold as long as (57) and (58) are satis…ed (this is due to R 0 h ; R 0 l ; V h > 0 and X 00 h (p) 0 ) V hP h < 0). Using (58) and interpreting P h as a function of P l we get
Since P h > P l implies h l < 0 and since lP l ; e lP l < 0 (because of X 00 l (p) < 0) we obtain
where the second line of (61) follows from (57) and (58). Since R l R h = h l = 0 for P h = P l , (61) implies 0 (P l ) < 0 if
Evaluating (62) and restricting the analysis to prices P h such that V h > 0 reveals (57) and (58) hold we must also have 0 (P l ) < 0. Combining this …nding with 0 (P l ) > 0 (as long as (57) and (58) are satis…ed) implies that if an interior equilibrium exists it is unique. Q.E.D.
